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Critiques of the Neurodiversity Movement
Ginny Russell
Preamble
I am going to recount some of the main reproaches to the movement,
as I understand them, and show how these are sometimes answered or
addressed by our contributors.This does not claim to be a “comprehensive”
account of critiques, as my knowledge of themovement is incomplete, and
like others’ understandings, my writing is situated by and limited by my
own reading and experiences [1]. Nevertheless, I believe it is important to
be aware of critiques, to engage with criticism, and openly debate, defend,
or modify one’s position, in both the political and academic spheres.
The start of my chapter concerns critiques that apply to identity poli-
tics more broadly: that they dichotomize allied groups into factions (this
prevents smaller identity groups from linking up, causing rivalries and
discord). Sociologist Charles Derber asserts that identity politics does not
include a broad critique of the political economy of capitalism, instead
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focusing on reforms. In a version of “divide and rule” argument he sug-
gests that fragmented and isolated identity movements have allowed for a
far-right resurgence [2]. There is also friction within identity politics over
definitions of who is included as “in” a particular group. The main cri-
tiques of the neurodiversity movement are then listed as follows: first, the
movement has been accused of being unrepresentative of all peoplewho are
“neurodivergent,” and specifically unrepresentative of more impaired peo-
ple on the autism spectrum (a criticism made by some clinicians, autistic
people, and parents). Second, it is said arguments made by the move-
ment are reductionist, promoting a genetic/brain-based understanding of
autism (a critique made by academics in social sciences, history, and phi-
losophy of biology).This may deflect attribution of personal responsibility
for behavior to the brain. Third, there is a criticism along the lines of the
well-known declaration that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house” [3].
How Identity Politics Dichotomizes
Would-Be Allies
Throughout this collection, contributors use the terms “neurotypical” and
“neurodivergent” to denote twodistinct groups. Accounts in this collection
byGarcia, Neumeier and Brown, and Arnold, amongst others, utilize both
terms. Disability scholar Runswick-Cole [4] has pointed out these terms
can be divisive, fostering an “us” and “them” mentality. She denounces a
dichotomized view of the world where you are either “in” or you are “out”.
Aswe know frommany studies of autismandother neurodevelopmental
conditions, autism and other diagnostic classes are psychiatric constructs
that denote a spectrum: a series of interrelated multidimensional traits.
These extend into the subclinical population, therefore many people who
do not have an autism diagnosis have autistic traits. This is known by
researchers as the “broad autism phenotype” [5–7]. It means there is no
clear bimodal distribution separating people with and without autism, so
in reality there are not two distinct populations, one “neurotypical” and
one “neurodivergent.” Instead autistic traits are distributed normally in
the whole human population [8], as are ADHD traits [9].
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In addition, the tendency to dichotomize runs contradictory to the
inclusive definitions of neurodiversity given in the book. DaVanport
(Chapter 11) talks about neurodiversity thus: “Neurodiversity soon
became something that I intimately understood as the all-inclusive accep-
tance of every neurological difference without exception. I further came
to appreciate that neurodiversity didn’t leave anyone out.” Greenburg
(Chapter 12) defines neurodiversity: “Neurodiversity in my world, is the
unquestioned right for all, whatever their neurological makeup, to express
what they need or want.” She writes: “While I can’t define the totality of
Neurodiversity even formyself,much less anyone else, I know spaceswhere
I can see it.” At another point in her text, Greenburg puts the emphasis on
difference, describing “non-autistics whose brains and experiences differ
from ours so much” (Chapter 12).
“Neurotypical” (NT) is never used pejoratively in this collection. But in
autism online commentaries and debates it has been suggested such crit-
ical language is justified by the poor treatment meted out to the autistic
community (as well documented here). Tisoncik discusses “autistic supe-
riority” (Chapter 5) which is the tendency to claim autistic people are
in some way superior to NT people. She writes, “I am not upset about
claims of autistic superiority,” explaining that although this is not her
position, “we don’t need to worry about oppressed groups with little to no
power singing their own exclusive praises.” An example of such a claim
comes from description of NTs from the forum Quora: “I’m being cruel
I know. It’s okay though they have all the power and they have discrim-
inated against me all my life. I’m allowed to make fun of their innate
stupidity…they expect everyone to know it because they are the center of
the universe. Their hypocrisy on this is near universal” [10].
The issue with this is common to all identity politics and best explained
by alluding to another movement—the feminist movement. The argu-
ment made is that it is fine to be pejorative about, or insulting to, people
that profit from the status quo. But this is the same as a feminist saying
pejorative things about men e.g. “all men are <insert pejorative/offensive
word here>”: a blanket dismissal of all men. Clearly, there are some men
who are feminists and sympathetic to the aims of the feminist movement.
Plus, many men have characteristics that mean they too are discriminated
against: gay men, disabled men, migrants, and so on. To dismiss them all
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in a blanket way will have the effect of alienating them from the cause. To
effect societal change, solidarity between such groups is vital, and those
on the left seeking to rebalance the status quo need to support each other’s
struggles. In addition, “all men are <insert pejorative term here>” is itself
a sexist statement. It is discriminatory to make offensive statements about
the “out” group, where the struggle should be against discrimination and
prejudice.
The true target for righteous anger, Runswick-Cole [4] and others have
argued, should be discriminatory and disabling societal structures, norms,
and practices. It is an issue many activists writing here seem well aware
of. Seidel, for example, writes: “I felt that needless discord, demagoguery,
and polarization could only exacerbate tensions and undermine advocacy
efforts” (Chapter 7).
Standpoint theorists support the idea that people with lived experience
have expertise in their own area [11]. This is the theoretical epistemic
stance that underpins this volume. It assumes standpoints are relative and
cannot be evaluated by any absolute criteria, but makes the assumption
that the oppressed (autistic people) are less biased (or more impartial) than
the privileged (NT people). This idea that people with lived experience
should be given more authority to speak, and make decisions about their
own futures, i.e. their voices should be given more weight than others, has
been criticized.To illustrate, take the example of female genital mutilation
(FMG), a practice widely abhorred.The main promoters of such practices
are often the grandmothers of the girls involved who themselves have
been subject to FGM. According to standpoint epistemology, such voices
(calling for FGM) should trump those of Western medical experts.
Another critique of the NT/ND divide is that “Neurotypical” is a very
dubious construct, and by default then so is “Neurodivergent.” Is there
anyone who is really, truly neurotypical? As Armstrong writes:
There is no such standard for the human brain. Search as you might, there
is no brain that has been pickled in a jar in the basement of the Smithsonian
Museum or the National Institute of Health or elsewhere in the world that
represents the standard to which all other human brains must be compared.
Given that this is the case, how dowe decide whether any individual human
brain or mind is abnormal or normal? [12]
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Of course, you do have to draw a line in the sand when you are demark-
ing yourself into a politically mobilized group.That is, for the neurodiver-
sity movement to exist there has to be a banner “Neurodivergent” under
which people can rally. That is required by any group—that you can argue
for rights for some people and not others, make the case for services for
some people and not others. I will drop the quote marks around “Neu-
rodivergent” for the remainder of this piece, as it is impossible to define
an identity-based movement without having a group identity. In order to
promote a positive self-identity too, you first need a group-based identity.
I understand that. But it is helpful to be aware, in tandem with this, that
dichotomizing can also cause difficulties.
Defining Who Is “In”: Who Is
Neurodivergent?
Another issue that applies to thewhole of identity politics is the problem of
definition of people in the category. It is not always clear from accounts in
the book who is neurodivergent, and who is not. However, this is a crucial
issue. If you are advocating for legal protection against discrimination, or
arguing for support and accommodations, it is really important to be able
to define who that group actually are. If you are not clear who exactly you
are fighting for, those rights cannot be operationalized in law.
The nature of brain differences between autistic and non-autistic people
is not well-established or well-replicated [13], and many neuroscientific
studies of ADHD, Tourette, autism, and other neurodevelopmental con-
ditions have mixed results that are not well-replicated. The reality is that
most of these conditions are diagnosed via observation, cognitive testing,
or self-report, and not via neurological anatomy or physiology. Not many
diagnoses involve brain scans, so the neurological differences of neurodi-
vergent people are not seen but inferred.
Perhaps who is “in” as neurodivergent (ND) could be decided by a
medical diagnosis of a neurodevelopmental disorder, or a mental health
condition that is thought to be underpinned by neurophysiology, like
autism or depression? Neumeier and Brown seem to suggest this when
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they write that “neurodivergence [includes] psychiatric disability or men-
tal illness” (Chapter 14). But the neurodiversity movement rallies against
the “medical model” as Arnold describes it, explaining his journal’s aim
to “embody a questioning and examining of the prevailing paradigms of
autism research” (Chapter 15). Then it is perhaps inappropriate to have
group inclusion criteria defined by medical diagnosis. Such a definition
would return the epistemic authority to define the group to medics, thus
rescinding the notion of “Nothing About Us Without Us” quoted exten-
sively by many contributors. Moreover, some people considered ND may
not yet have been diagnosed.
Perhaps, then, self-identification as ND is less problematic? Giwa
Onaiwu opted for this approach, “to accept the validity of people’s self-
identification as stated,” when compiling her intersectional anthology (see
Chapter 18). Self-definition certainly avoids the problems listed above, but
has caused huge divisions in other areas of identity politics. Arguments
between radicals in the feminist movement and the transgender activists
again provide an example. Some radical feminists have argued that being
a woman should be defined by biological sex and being bought up female
from birth, whereas the transgender activists have argued that anyone who
self-identifies as female is female. The trans-excluding radical feminists
assert that decades of rights they have fought for to have women-only
safe spaces are now being undermined, if (wo)men who self-identify as
women are now allowed into them. This issue was satirized in the UK by
a Labour party member who previously made it onto the list of candidates
for women’s officer because he “identifies as a woman on Wednesdays,”
under Labour’s “self-id” rules [14]. The man has now been suspended
from the party.
Self-definition may also exclude some people, who may be part of the
“in” group, but may not be aware of being in the group at all. For example,
ND people with late-stage dementia, or profound intellectual disability.
Others who may be ND don’t want to be labeled as such. Activists writ-
ing in the collection seem aware of the potential complications arising
from dividing people into well-defined groups, and several try to address
the problem. For example, Buckle explains the decision for no inclusion
criteria whatsoever at Autscape thus:
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Having inclusion criteria, e.g. “autistics only” creates suspicion about
whether those in the group are really “us” or may be “them,” whether delib-
erately (infiltrators) or bymistake (falsely identifying as autistic). Exclusivity
also lends itself to the spread of prejudice and misinformation about the
excluded group. (Chapter 8)
Even having read this collection and others, I still am unclear about who
exactly is “in,” how widely the neurodiversity movement casts its net in
defining ND. Does it include just people with autism and other neurode-
velopmental conditions like “people with autism, dyspraxia, ADHD,” as
Garcia states (Chapter 17), or does it further include people with depres-
sion, schizophrenia, Tourette’s, psychopathology, as Neumeier and Brown
suggest in Chapter 14? In this case neurodiversity should be inclusive
of neurodegenerative conditions like dementia, and Parkinson’s too. The
problem is the boundary around who is “in” the ND class and who is
“out” is currently not transparent or well-defined.
Representativeness
Several vocal autistic people and parents have complained that the move-
ment is made up mostly of less impaired individuals who do not represent
people with more severe problems [15]. I have also heard people comment
at autism conferences that persons in the movement are not representa-
tive of most ND adults or children, and are not well-appointed to speak
for them. My understanding is that the argument is, broadly, parents of
more severely disabled children are keen for treatments to ease their chil-
dren’s condition, whereas the neurodiversity movement is seen as anti-cure
[13]. Activists counter that the movement does advocate for supports that
mitigate weaknesses associated with autism, arguably focusing more on
improving access to reliable communication and certainly more on essen-
tial services (which mostly go to those with the highest needs) than most
organizations and individuals interested in curing autism.
Those parents supporting more medically-oriented models identify the
distress and difficulties associated with neurodevelopmental conditions
as impairments [16]. Such difficulties lead to problems in functioning
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and lower quality of life. From this point of view, the conditions that
are encompassed by neurodiversity are medical conditions that can and
should be cured if possible. Autistic people have also spoken in favor of
this more pathologized view: “Many of us aren’t high-functioning enough
to benefit from depathologizing autism…I still feel autism keeping me
from achieving my potential” [17].
It is important to note, however, that many parents are in the move-
ment, including somewriting here.Themovement allows space for parents
and other allies. Sometimes their children, as in the case of Des Roches
Rosa, don’t have the language skills to engage in conventional activism. So
parents are another way in the movement that those who cannot directly
represent themselves in formal activism are represented.
Academics have made similar critiques. Ortega [18] argues that so far
the movement has been dominated by people diagnosed with Asperger
Syndrome and other forms of “high-functioning autism.” I have heard
a pediatrician-academic dismiss the movement using the same criticism.
Casanova, a prominent neurologist writes: “the records that we have at
present on neurodiversity are the records of an elite, those that stand at
the top…misrepresentation of opinions of the pro-neurodiversity elite as
being representative of those at the bottom” [19]. This forms part of a
vitriolic attack that claims, “the only thing they have accomplished is the
creation of a split in the autism community that allows for themselves
and nobody else…Neurodiversity is a social club where many of its par-
ticipants are non-autistic individuals claiming to be autistics.” In another
article (also condemned bymembers of themovement) Jaarsma andWelin
make the case that that the neurodiversity doctrine is sensible if it is only
applicable to this narrow group “only a narrow conception of neurodiver-
sity, referring exclusively to high-functioning autists, is reasonable” [20].
Activist blogger Hiari, who herself has been given a diagnosis of autism,
writes for the critical psychiatry site Mad in America. She issues another
stinging critique of the neurodiversity movement [21], writing that the
movement amounts to no more than:
A public relations campaign that emphasizes the many positive qualities
associated with some presentations of autism—creativity, increased toler-
ance for repetition, enhanced empathy, superior ability to master content
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in specific subject areas, and exceptional memory—while erasing or mini-
mizing the experiences of autistics who are severely disabled.
People at the vanguard of the neurodiversity movement have often
been autistic, as this volume testifies, and they have mobilized through
making contact online or on email lists, InLv, and autistics.org being prime
examples.Themainmethodofmobilizationof the autistic/neurodivergent
community therefore inadvertently excludes people who are unable to
make contact with each other on computers: “Many on the spectrum can’t
speak or use a computer” Mitchell asserts [15]. In the current volume,
Buckle discusses the efforts that have been made to be as inclusive as
possible at Autscape: “we have tried to include some activities that are
more accessible to people who don’t handle words as well as most of us,
withmixed success.” She also touches on the practical barriers to achieving
full inclusivity and provides a fantastically practical guide to designing
autistic-friendly events.
Parents point out that as young children and those with profound intel-
lectual disability cannot advocate for themselves, they as parents must.
Activists in themovement counter that parentsmay have a different agenda
to those with lived experience. Activists have stated the case for first-person
representation: that elsewhere in society we accept the idea that anyone
who speaks for a group should be a member of the group, and by that rea-
soning any spokesperson for autistic people should be autistic. There are
some prominent advocates who themselves or whose child have been diag-
nosed with intellectual disability or who are non-speaking, some of whom
have contributed to this collection. Baggs, who is non-speaking, writes
“I’d far rather have Michelle Dawson, Cal Montgomery, Laura Tisoncik,
Joelle Smith, or Larry Arnold, speaking on my behalf than these parents”
(Chapter 6).
The implication of several writers in the collection is that they are
related to other autistic people. Garcia writes of “my autistic brethren”
(Chapter 17), and daVanport, “we are linked by a familiar neurology”
(Chapter 11). Such statements create a kinship argument: that all autistic
people are somehow of one tribe and genetically related, or neurologically
similar, so are best qualified to talk about issues that affect the autism
community.
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The Science and Technologies scholar Silverman critiques the kinship
argument in her book Understanding Autism [13], explaining that autis-
tic advocates’ predicate their claim to represent the autism community
in “presumed neurological and genetic likeness to other autistic people”
(p. 142). Silverman argues such presumed relatedness lends ethical legiti-
macy and entitlement to be representatives of the whole group, but points
out a contradiction if the group embrace genetic and neuro-explanations,
but reject genetic research.
Reductionism
Ortega [18] assesses many of the critiques raised here, and points to the
rise of neurological and biologically based explanations for behavior, which
replaced the dominant psychoanalytic models of the 1970s. For autism,
the “refrigerator mother” theory was interpreted to mean that autism was
a reaction to an emotionally deprived upbringing. The shift to a primar-
ily genetic and neurological understandings of autism in the 1980s was
ushered in by the pioneering twin studies that provided conclusive evi-
dence of the heritability of autistic traits [22]. The history of autism and
how children’s mental health and deviance has been variously conceived
is covered in many excellent texts, all worth reading [13, 23–25].
There is also bio-medicalization [26]. This process is defined by Con-
rad as virtually the reverse of neurodiversity: the transformation of every-
day human conditions and behaviors into diagnosable, treatable disorders
that come to fall under medical jurisdiction [27]. Silverman has cited
the increasing diagnosis of autism as an instance of medicalization [13].
Hedgecoe [28] has written about the process of geneticization, through
which a condition comes to be understood primarily as genetic. Bumiller
has written about this with reference to autism [29].
The rise of neuro-understandings is another example of the way behav-
iors are now framed as having biological underpinnings. Satel and Lilien-
field [30] call this process “Neurocentrism”: that is, the tendency to use
neurological explanations to explain aspects of a person’s behavior, e.g.
Shannon Rosa’s account of her son: “he was born with his autistic brain”
(Chapter 12).
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Both neurocentrism and geneticization have been critiqued as forms of
biological reductionism, partly because they de-emphasize the complexity
through which behaviors are shaped. A reductionist account would see
psychological facts as reducible to neurological facts, which is in turn are
reducible to biological facts.One consequence of labelingwith a diagnostic
category like autism is that autistic people’s behavior is attributed to brain
difference, rather than being under their control [31, 32].The philosopher
of biology Dupré argues against such reductionist accounts of human
behavior [33], and opposes the use of causal language.
That genes “cause” autism can be critiqued onmany levels. First, behav-
ioral traits which identify autism are exacerbated by the social context and
they change over a child’s development, so do not imply a fixed state. Some
children classified as having autism outgrow their diagnosis, so autism is
not necessarily a stable neurological difference throughout the lifecourse
[34]. Second, genetic association studies show there is a multi-factorial,
complex, genetic predisposition to autism which interacts with epigenetic
factors. Third, the environment may alter the development of a person’s
neurology throughout the lifecourse, whatever their genetics. Fourth, neu-
rology is not fixed but constantly adapted through learning. Dupré argues
a better model would be probabilistic causality , where nothing “causes”
something else but instead increases the chances of it happening.
Although some activists writing in this collection adopted sim-
pler reductionist models, others show their knowledge of complexity:
“Genetic research indicates that at least twenty different genes can sig-
nal a predisposition to autistic development” (Seidel, Chapter 7); “the
genetic factors involved in autism [are] very complex” (Evans, Chapter 9).
Embracing a more nuanced understanding may be a better reflection
of reality, but perhaps neglects the impact causal models can have on the
real world. For parents of autistic children, for example, the geneticization
of autism has meant thousands of mothers escape the guilt and blame
that “refrigerator mother” theory engendered. For neurodiversity activists,
neuro-models can be a potent instrument to securing accommodations,
services, and rights, and gaining political recognition [18].
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Medicalization and the Master’s House
More widely, medicalization has been defined as the process through
which normal behaviors come to fall under medical jurisdiction [27].
In this sense, the neurodiversity movement seeks to de-medicalize autism,
because members have argued that autism is a part of normal human
variation and should not be considered as a disorder or in medicalized
terms. But at the same time, underpinning these arguments are very
biologically/neurologically-grounded models of understanding of differ-
ence (e.g. “neuro”-differences, “neuro”-diversity). Arguably, these are part
of the medicalized framework. The neurodiversity activists therefore co-
opt parts of the medical model, whilst espousing broad opposition to the
medical model of autism. The whole volume illustrates how a medical-
ized understanding of autism as a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder
differs from the understanding of autism in the accounts of neurodiver-
sity activists. Contributors describe the medical framework as tending to
pathologize people:
We were so used to being misunderstood, patronized and pathologized
(Dekker)
The dangers of using a selective pathological description (Baggs)
Undue pathologization of their traits (Seidel)
More general resistance is expressed, e.g. “our community had been
segregated by a medical model which insisted on separating us from our
natural peers” (Craine, Chapter 19). Such accounts show opposition to
medicalization, yet sometimes deploy medicalized rhetoric. In this sense
theNDMcan be interpreted as using theMaster’s toolsmedical narratives]
to tear down the Master’s house [the medical taxonomic framework], a
euphemism used by Lorde [3], a black lesbian feminist.
Lorde’s reference to the inability of “the Master’s tools to dismantle the
Master’s house” [3] is a critique of utilizing the rules of those in power.
Lorde is arguing that playing their (theMaster’s) game cannot bring about
genuine revolutionary change. ASAN’s input into DSM-5, which defines
how autism is understood and identified (Chapter 13), was to gain reform
not revolution. ASANchose to engagewith the psychiatric system and play
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the rules—adopting the language of science and using scientific citations
to communicate their political points to represent the best interests of
the autistic community. Kapp and Ne’eman thus provides an excellent
counter to the “Master’s tools” argument in Chapter 13, showing how
ASAN brought about meaningful change. Their tactic of engagement
with the establishment is reminiscent of the AIDS activists’ strategy of
becoming proficient with and co-opting scientific empiricism to become
scientific experts and communicate with the scientific establishment [35].
At the same time, they argue that the DSM should openly acknowledge
that diagnosis is partly shaped as a political, as well as a scientific process, a
point made by others in the academic literature. Aronowitz, for example,
argues that symptoms become “a disease” through social and political
processes [36]. Acknowledging and encouraging the socio-political nature
of psychiatric taxonomy of DSM underlines that autism is an entity that
is both constructed and is a neurodevelopmental difference.
It can be pathologizing to be given a diagnosis of disorder. At the same
time, the medical diagnosis can act as an explanation of the experience of
difference, a rallying point for political action, a tool to unlock resources
and services, and a first step inmoving toward entering a community. Kapp
and Ne’eman acknowledge there is a need for a diagnosis but suggest a
middle way might be possible: “We believe that identification of autism
should transition to a non-pathological system.”
I have questions about one’s responsibility for behavior and the way
diagnosis (or a diagnostic category) excuses deviant (or poor) behavior as
a form of sickness [37]. The problem is a “born this way” narrative de-
emphasizes personal responsibility, which can be tremendously helpful,
but can sometimes be used as an excuse to avoid culpability. If a person
was diagnosed with Tourette’s, their swearing would be seen as an invol-
untary aspect of their condition, promoting tolerance and acceptance. On
the other hand, what about a psychopathic person who manipulates and
exploits others? This behavior also seems to fall under the wider neurodi-
versity banner, so does the neurodiversity movement require acceptance
that the person can’t control their behavior, and therefore not culpable
or responsible for their behavior? Should neurodivergence be more often
considered as a legal mitigating factor? ADHD is strongly associated with
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criminal behavior, for example [38]. Again, perhaps a more nuanced ques-
tioning of repercussions of these concepts may be necessary.
Group Think
A final critique is the accusation that the movement requires conformity.
Some complain the movement may engender social conformism through
doctrinal thinking that excludes autistic people with diverse viewpoints.
Hiari asserts that “The neurodiversity movement epitomizes groupthink”
[21], and cites the expulsion of autistics like pro-cureMitchell and Google
engineer Damore (who wrote that male/female disparities can be partly
explained by biological difference). I am not sure of the legitimacy of these
arguments if Neurodiversity is considered as a political ideology. If it is
thought of this way, the neurodiversity movement operates more like a
political group, and is entitled to throw out members who express views
contrary to the party line. Just because you are female does not make you
a feminist.
Conclusion
These are some of the critiques faced by the neurodiversity movement.
Whilst the movement seeks a non-pathologizing form of identity and the
autistic activist community and allies have made a unique contribution
toward this, this aim may sometimes sit uncomfortably with pragmatic
forms that their activism takes.
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